 My book, On Cold Iron, A Story of Hubris and the 1907 Quebec Bridge Collapse, tells the story of how Canadian Indigenous people from Kahnawake first became involved in high steel work. It also describes what happened to the children of Kahnawake in the wake of the disaster. In 1907 thirty-three ironworkers from the Mohawk village of Kahnawake were killed when the Quebec Bridge collapsed during construction. The disaster left fifty-two minor Kahnawake children fatherless. The week after the disaster, the Federal Department of Indian Affairs dispatched an experienced agent to meet with the Chief and Council in Kahnawake. The parish priest was in attendance. The agent, James Macrae advised the Council that although the government could not “take in hand the cause of the widows and orphans” to obtain damages, it did offer the department’s assistance in arranging for concerted action. As far as the priest was concerned, the only pressing matter was to relieve the widows by taking their children and placing them in industrial schools. He said there was room at a school in Manitoulin, Ontario. Wikwemikong was a residential school for children run by the Jesuits and funded by the federal government. It was known for its strict discipline. Macrae said he would discuss it with his boss and asked for a list of the children. Fortunately, Macrae and his boss thought ill of the idea and ultimately the children stayed in their community. The tradition of the Mohawk men working on high steel that began in 1886 with the construction of the CPR bridge near Kahnawake continued after the collapse of the bridge and in fact, the young Mohawk men from the community wanted more than ever to work on high steel in rivet gangs. Although the children were not sent away to Residential Schools, they attended one of 11 Day Schools that operated in the village of Kahnawake between 1868 and 1988. These schools were run by churches and funded, managed and controlled by the Federal Government. Abuse, physical and sexual, was common in these schools. As one elder said, the only difference between Day Schools and the Residential Schools was that you got to go home at night. A class action was brought in 2018 on behalf of the victims of all Day Schools across Canada. The Federal Court certified a nation-wide settlement in 2019, which has resulted in compensation being paid to many who suffered. Claims can be made until July 2022. Muskrat Falls and the Quebec Bridge |
 The Muskrat Falls Hydroelectric Project in Labrador |  The Second Completed Quebec Bridge as it Stands Today |
The week before my book, On Cold Iron was published, the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Muskrat Falls Hydroelectric Project was made public. Due to significant cost overruns and other issues related to the project’s sanctioning and execution, the government of Newfoundland and Labrador established a Commission of Inquiry in 2017. The cost for Muskrat Falls is nearly double the original estimate, and the project is several years behind schedule. The completion date is as yet unknown. The sole Commissioner, Justice Richard Leblanc of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland and Labrador titled his report, “Muskrat Falls: A Misguided Project.” The mega-project has become a huge financial burden on the Province and its people.
Justice Leblanc’s report reminded me in some respects of the report and findings of the three commissioners who inquired into the collapse of the Quebec Bridge in 1907, the subject of my book. The cost of the Quebec Bridge far exceeded the original estimates and it too was completed much later than planned. Tragically, during the first attempt to bridge the St. Lawrence, the southern span collapsed, killing seventy-six men. Although the projects are more than a century apart, Muskrat Falls appears to repeat some of the same mistakes that led to the Quebec Bridge disaster.
I noted three findings in Justice Richard's report that are reminiscent of the findings of the Quebec Bridge Inquiry.
1. Both projects were led and managed by people with little or no experience with projects of this type or magnitude.
The board of directors of Nalcor was comprised of oilmen. The chairman had spent twenty-five years in the oil industry, mainly in the financial and business side of things. He had no experience with significant engineering, construction or project management matters, and no exposure to hydroelectric or transmission line projects. The chair appointed an individual to act as project director who also had no experience in the construction of hydroelectric or transmission projects.
Justice Leblanc had this to say about the Nalcor board:
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (GNL) expected Nalcor’s board of directors to provide oversight, good judgment and to exercise its fiduciary duty, even though GNL was fully aware that the board lacked the breadth of expertise to adequately do so. The board members, although sincere and dedicated in their efforts, had no specialized knowledge or experience in megaproject construction and therefore lacked the ability to effectively challenge management about the Project’s costs, schedule and risks, and generally to provide oversight on behalf of the shareholder, GNL.
The board of directors of the federally funded Quebec Bridge Company comprised well-intentioned businessmen from Quebec City and surrounding areas. However, no one on the board had any experience in construction, let alone with a project of this magnitude. The Quebec Bridge was to be the longest clear span bridge of any kind ever built; in fact, with a clear span of 1,800 feet, it still holds the record as the longest cantilever bridge in the world. The chairman of the board was a politician. At one point in time, he was the mayor of Quebec City, the premier of the province of Quebec, as well as the chairman of the board of the Quebec Bridge Company. He was also a colleague and personal friend of Canada’s Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier.
No one on the Quebec Bridge board fully understood what they were dealing with or the importance of appointing qualified people to advise them. They appointed a chief engineer who did not have the requisite knowledge and experience for such an undertaking. In their findings, the commissioners admonished the board for its failure to appoint an experienced bridge engineer to the position of chief engineer. And while they acknowledged that the individual was of good character and devoted to his duty, they noted:
The Company’s directors do not seem to have realized the importance of the duties pertaining to Mr. H’s position, and while believing that he was not competent to control the work, they still gave him the position, the powers, and the emoluments of the office of chief engineer. This appointment was a mistake and resulted in a loose and inefficient supervision of all parts of the work.
2. The decision-makers for the project were not at the project site where the work was being carried out; they were in their offices hundreds of miles away. The people at site were stripped of any decision-making authority; all decisions were made at the head offices.
The project management team hired by Nalcor also came from the oil and gas industry. Except for one individual, none of them had any experience with hydroelectric or transmission projects. Justice Leblanc noted a recurring theme in witness testimony, that the project management team (PMT) micromanaged from a distance while not spending enough time on site. He wrote:
While it is normal for the most senior managers on a project to work out of a home office some distance from the work site, the PMT did not achieve an appropriate and balanced allocation of decision-making authority but instead tightly controlled and attempted to micromanage construction decisions from afar. The particular challenges of the Project, when combined with the PMT’s lack of hydroelectric experience and unwillingness to delegate authority, caused cost overruns and schedule delays. Although the PMT was aware by early 2014 that this was causing problems, it had no interest in taking a different approach. The PMT’s refusal to concede that management could have been improved in any way speaks volumes about how this Project was governed.
Recognizing that the person they appointed to act as chief engineer did not have the requisite skill and expertise, the Quebec Bridge Company board appointed a consulting engineer from New York to review and approve the contractor’s design and construction plans. However, the consulting engineer was unable or unwilling to travel the 700 miles to site from his office. Further, the American contractor building the work organized the project in such a way that their field personnel could not make any important decisions without first checking with the engineers in the head office in Pennsylvania, 500 miles away. This lack of authority at site proved fatal. Weeks before the collapse, the bridge was showing signs of failure, but no action was taken. The commissioners wrote:
It was clear that on that day the greatest bridge in the world was being built without there being a single man within reach who by experience, knowledge and ability was competent to deal with the crisis.
3. There was a lack of oversight, accountability and transparency on the projects. This resulted from the actions taken by the respective boards, and particularly by the chairmen, who went to great lengths to have their projects freed from such constraints.
Justice Leblanc accepted testimony from a number of witnesses that Nalcor was a “fiefdom” and “a runaway train.” He hi-lighted the lack of oversight, particularly by the Public Utilities Board and made the flowing recommendations:
1. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador should never undertake, on its own or through one of its Crown corporations or agencies, the planning, approval or construction of any large project (meaning a project with a budget of $50 million or more) without:
a. Engaging independent external experts to provide robust review, assessment and analysis of the project
b. Providing well-defined oversight after consideration of oversight processes instituted in other jurisdictions
2. The Public Utilities Board should review the proposed business case, reliability, cost and schedule of any large project that could potentially impact Newfoundland and Labrador electricity ratepayers. Following this review, the Public Utilities Board should report its findings to the government and the public.
The Quebec Bridge project was federally funded. As such, it was to have been closely overseen by the federal department of transportation. The deputy minister planned to hire an independent engineer, acting on behalf of the federal government to carefully review all plans and design for the structure. The chairman of the board of the Quebec Bridge Company, its consulting engineer in New York, and the American contractor convinced the federal government to forego this oversight role. They argued that the normal review by the government would result in needless delays, and that since the interests of the federal government and those of the Quebec Bridge Company were one and the same, the government should simply accept the Quebec Bridge Company’s consulting engineer’s review as sufficient and final. The government agreed, leaving the longest span bridge ever built in the hands of the consulting engineer whose pride and arrogance prevented him from admitting that the design for the bridge was flawed.
The senior people involved in the Quebec Bridge and Muskrat Falls projects were self-confident to the point of arrogance. Had there been even a trace of humility on the part of those involved, perhaps the disastrous outcomes might have been avoided. These projects, like so many others, lacked a culture of critical thinking and humility. Here we are, one hundred years later, and in spite of huge advances in technology, we continue to make the same mistakes.
April 2020
Justice Leblanc’s report reminded me in some respects of the report and findings of the three commissioners who inquired into the collapse of the Quebec Bridge in 1907, the subject of my book. The cost of the Quebec Bridge far exceeded the original estimates and it too was completed much later than planned. Tragically, during the first attempt to bridge the St. Lawrence, the southern span collapsed, killing seventy-six men. Although the projects are more than a century apart, Muskrat Falls appears to repeat some of the same mistakes that led to the Quebec Bridge disaster.
I noted three findings in Justice Richard's report that are reminiscent of the findings of the Quebec Bridge Inquiry.
1. Both projects were led and managed by people with little or no experience with projects of this type or magnitude.
The board of directors of Nalcor was comprised of oilmen. The chairman had spent twenty-five years in the oil industry, mainly in the financial and business side of things. He had no experience with significant engineering, construction or project management matters, and no exposure to hydroelectric or transmission line projects. The chair appointed an individual to act as project director who also had no experience in the construction of hydroelectric or transmission projects.
Justice Leblanc had this to say about the Nalcor board:
The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador (GNL) expected Nalcor’s board of directors to provide oversight, good judgment and to exercise its fiduciary duty, even though GNL was fully aware that the board lacked the breadth of expertise to adequately do so. The board members, although sincere and dedicated in their efforts, had no specialized knowledge or experience in megaproject construction and therefore lacked the ability to effectively challenge management about the Project’s costs, schedule and risks, and generally to provide oversight on behalf of the shareholder, GNL.
The board of directors of the federally funded Quebec Bridge Company comprised well-intentioned businessmen from Quebec City and surrounding areas. However, no one on the board had any experience in construction, let alone with a project of this magnitude. The Quebec Bridge was to be the longest clear span bridge of any kind ever built; in fact, with a clear span of 1,800 feet, it still holds the record as the longest cantilever bridge in the world. The chairman of the board was a politician. At one point in time, he was the mayor of Quebec City, the premier of the province of Quebec, as well as the chairman of the board of the Quebec Bridge Company. He was also a colleague and personal friend of Canada’s Prime Minister, Sir Wilfred Laurier.
No one on the Quebec Bridge board fully understood what they were dealing with or the importance of appointing qualified people to advise them. They appointed a chief engineer who did not have the requisite knowledge and experience for such an undertaking. In their findings, the commissioners admonished the board for its failure to appoint an experienced bridge engineer to the position of chief engineer. And while they acknowledged that the individual was of good character and devoted to his duty, they noted:
The Company’s directors do not seem to have realized the importance of the duties pertaining to Mr. H’s position, and while believing that he was not competent to control the work, they still gave him the position, the powers, and the emoluments of the office of chief engineer. This appointment was a mistake and resulted in a loose and inefficient supervision of all parts of the work.
2. The decision-makers for the project were not at the project site where the work was being carried out; they were in their offices hundreds of miles away. The people at site were stripped of any decision-making authority; all decisions were made at the head offices.
The project management team hired by Nalcor also came from the oil and gas industry. Except for one individual, none of them had any experience with hydroelectric or transmission projects. Justice Leblanc noted a recurring theme in witness testimony, that the project management team (PMT) micromanaged from a distance while not spending enough time on site. He wrote:
While it is normal for the most senior managers on a project to work out of a home office some distance from the work site, the PMT did not achieve an appropriate and balanced allocation of decision-making authority but instead tightly controlled and attempted to micromanage construction decisions from afar. The particular challenges of the Project, when combined with the PMT’s lack of hydroelectric experience and unwillingness to delegate authority, caused cost overruns and schedule delays. Although the PMT was aware by early 2014 that this was causing problems, it had no interest in taking a different approach. The PMT’s refusal to concede that management could have been improved in any way speaks volumes about how this Project was governed.
Recognizing that the person they appointed to act as chief engineer did not have the requisite skill and expertise, the Quebec Bridge Company board appointed a consulting engineer from New York to review and approve the contractor’s design and construction plans. However, the consulting engineer was unable or unwilling to travel the 700 miles to site from his office. Further, the American contractor building the work organized the project in such a way that their field personnel could not make any important decisions without first checking with the engineers in the head office in Pennsylvania, 500 miles away. This lack of authority at site proved fatal. Weeks before the collapse, the bridge was showing signs of failure, but no action was taken. The commissioners wrote:
It was clear that on that day the greatest bridge in the world was being built without there being a single man within reach who by experience, knowledge and ability was competent to deal with the crisis.
3. There was a lack of oversight, accountability and transparency on the projects. This resulted from the actions taken by the respective boards, and particularly by the chairmen, who went to great lengths to have their projects freed from such constraints.
Justice Leblanc accepted testimony from a number of witnesses that Nalcor was a “fiefdom” and “a runaway train.” He hi-lighted the lack of oversight, particularly by the Public Utilities Board and made the flowing recommendations:
1. The Government of Newfoundland and Labrador should never undertake, on its own or through one of its Crown corporations or agencies, the planning, approval or construction of any large project (meaning a project with a budget of $50 million or more) without:
a. Engaging independent external experts to provide robust review, assessment and analysis of the project
b. Providing well-defined oversight after consideration of oversight processes instituted in other jurisdictions
2. The Public Utilities Board should review the proposed business case, reliability, cost and schedule of any large project that could potentially impact Newfoundland and Labrador electricity ratepayers. Following this review, the Public Utilities Board should report its findings to the government and the public.
The Quebec Bridge project was federally funded. As such, it was to have been closely overseen by the federal department of transportation. The deputy minister planned to hire an independent engineer, acting on behalf of the federal government to carefully review all plans and design for the structure. The chairman of the board of the Quebec Bridge Company, its consulting engineer in New York, and the American contractor convinced the federal government to forego this oversight role. They argued that the normal review by the government would result in needless delays, and that since the interests of the federal government and those of the Quebec Bridge Company were one and the same, the government should simply accept the Quebec Bridge Company’s consulting engineer’s review as sufficient and final. The government agreed, leaving the longest span bridge ever built in the hands of the consulting engineer whose pride and arrogance prevented him from admitting that the design for the bridge was flawed.
The senior people involved in the Quebec Bridge and Muskrat Falls projects were self-confident to the point of arrogance. Had there been even a trace of humility on the part of those involved, perhaps the disastrous outcomes might have been avoided. These projects, like so many others, lacked a culture of critical thinking and humility. Here we are, one hundred years later, and in spite of huge advances in technology, we continue to make the same mistakes.
April 2020
"On Cold Iron" – Where the Idea Came From
The idea for On Cold Iron came to me in 1985, during my second year of law school. I was writing a paper on expert evidence and, being an engineer, I decided to use a bridge disaster as my case study. On August 29, 1907 the southern span of the Quebec Bridge, the longest cantilever bridge in the world, collapsed during construction, taking the lives of 76 men. A Royal Commission of Inquiry comprising three senior engineers was appointed by the federal government to investigate and determine the cause of the collapse. I first became aware of the disaster in my final year of engineering at the University of New Brunswick in 1978.
After completing the requirements for my engineering degree, I was invited to take part in the solemn Ritual of the Calling of an Engineer, a ceremony created by Rudyard Kipling, in which the aspiring engineer takes an Obligation to adhere to high ethical and professional standards. During the ceremony, the Obligated engineer receives an Iron Ring, to be worn on the small finger of the working hand as a reminder of their Obligation. The first such ceremony took place in Montreal in 1925. It is uniquely Canadian.
When I received my Ring, I was told by a classmate that the original Rings were made with steel that came from the collapsed Quebec Bridge. For years I wondered about this possible connection and whether there was any truth behind it. But I didn’t pursue it, not until law school seven years later.
My research for my law school paper began with the four-hundred-page transcript of the proceedings before the Royal Commission of Inquiry. The story that unfolded from witness testimony was fascinating. It was a tale of hubris; arrogant engineers refusing to believe that their design was flawed, even though the Bridge was showing obvious signs of failure days before the collapse. The bridge could not have been saved, but the lives of those men might have been spared if there had been even a trace of humility in any of the senior engineers involved; they wouldn’t admit their mistakes. The story was dramatic; it had all the elements of a great human tragedy.
Although I can’t recall how I did, researching for my paper ignited in me a fascination for the story of the Quebec Bridge and its possible connection to the Iron Ring. That’s when I decided to write a book about it. But, the book would have to do the story justice. It would need to bring this true story to life in a way that engineers would remember it, and hopefully learn something from it. The book could even serve as a reminder of the Obligation that we took, On Cold Iron.
That was 1985. My book was published in 2020; only took 35 years. At this rate, my next book should be out when I’m 102!
After completing the requirements for my engineering degree, I was invited to take part in the solemn Ritual of the Calling of an Engineer, a ceremony created by Rudyard Kipling, in which the aspiring engineer takes an Obligation to adhere to high ethical and professional standards. During the ceremony, the Obligated engineer receives an Iron Ring, to be worn on the small finger of the working hand as a reminder of their Obligation. The first such ceremony took place in Montreal in 1925. It is uniquely Canadian.
When I received my Ring, I was told by a classmate that the original Rings were made with steel that came from the collapsed Quebec Bridge. For years I wondered about this possible connection and whether there was any truth behind it. But I didn’t pursue it, not until law school seven years later.
My research for my law school paper began with the four-hundred-page transcript of the proceedings before the Royal Commission of Inquiry. The story that unfolded from witness testimony was fascinating. It was a tale of hubris; arrogant engineers refusing to believe that their design was flawed, even though the Bridge was showing obvious signs of failure days before the collapse. The bridge could not have been saved, but the lives of those men might have been spared if there had been even a trace of humility in any of the senior engineers involved; they wouldn’t admit their mistakes. The story was dramatic; it had all the elements of a great human tragedy.
Although I can’t recall how I did, researching for my paper ignited in me a fascination for the story of the Quebec Bridge and its possible connection to the Iron Ring. That’s when I decided to write a book about it. But, the book would have to do the story justice. It would need to bring this true story to life in a way that engineers would remember it, and hopefully learn something from it. The book could even serve as a reminder of the Obligation that we took, On Cold Iron.
That was 1985. My book was published in 2020; only took 35 years. At this rate, my next book should be out when I’m 102!
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Dan Levert's Blog
Professional engineer, construction lawyer and author of On Cold Iron.
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